Category | Details |
---|---|
Threat Actors | Sodinokibi (REvil), QakBot operators, Valak operators, ransomware affiliates (e.g., Clop, Ryuk, Egregor). |
Campaign Overview | Specialized and collaborative ransomware attacks leveraging phishing emails for initial access, reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and ransomware deployment. |
Target Regions/Victims | Organizations targeted via phishing campaigns, with emphasis on systems managing critical data such as financial, healthcare, and intellectual property. |
Methodology | Initial access via phishing emails, lateral movement with stolen credentials, recon with native tools, and ransomware deployment after data exfiltration. |
Product Targeted | Microsoft Office, Active Directory, SMB protocol, Windows Defender (disabled during attacks), Kaseya (zero-day exploitation). |
Malware Reference | Sodinokibi (REvil), QakBot, Valak, Cobalt Strike, NetSupport Manager, Rclone, MegaSync, MegaCmd, WinSCP, Mimikatz. |
Tools Used | Excel 4.0 macros, VBA macros, rundll32.exe, plink.exe, ngrok.exe, PSExec, AdFind, nltest, WMI utility, custom PowerShell payloads. |
Vulnerabilities Exploited | Kaseya zero-day, weak email security for phishing, misconfigured SMB, poorly monitored administrative accounts. |
TTPs | Phishing for initial access, living-off-the-land tools for recon, credential harvesting with Mimikatz, lateral movement via PowerShell and services, double extortion tactic. |
Attribution | Sodinokibi infrastructure linked to ransomware affiliates; shared techniques and tools suggest connections among multiple groups. |
Recommendations | Implement LAPS, reduce SMB attack surface, use EDR, enforce least privilege access, deploy MFA, segment internal networks, and manage vulnerabilities systematically. |
Source | Security Intelligence |
Read full article: https://securityintelligence.com/posts/sodinokibi-ransomware-incident-response-intelligence-together/
The above summary has been generated by an AI language model
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