Category | Details |
---|---|
Threat Actors | TA571, ClearFake, various financially motivated and espionage groups (e.g., UAC-0050, Russian espionage targeting Ukraine). |
Campaign Overview | Use of ClickFix technique (fake error messages to run PowerShell scripts) to deliver malware like AsyncRAT, Danabot, Lumma Stealer, etc. |
Target Regions (Or Victims) | Global, specifically targeting organizations in Ukraine, Switzerland, and potentially transportation/logistics firms. |
Methodology | Social engineering with fake error messages prompting users to run malicious PowerShell scripts (via reCAPTCHA phishing, fake CAPTCHA). |
Product targeted | PowerShell, reCAPTCHA, various enterprise software (Microsoft Word, Google Chrome), Swiss e-commerce marketplace Ricardo. |
Malware Reference | AsyncRAT, Danabot, DarkGate, Lumma Stealer, NetSupport RAT, Brute Ratel C4, Latrodectus, XWorm. |
Tools Used | PowerShell, reCAPTCHA Phish (open source tool), MSHTA, Base64 encoding, SharpHide, ProtWare HTML Guardian, GitHub, Dropbox. |
Vulnerabilities Exploited | Human error in executing malicious PowerShell commands, weak awareness of social engineering techniques. |
TTPs | Phishing via social engineering (fake error messages), use of compromised websites, fake CAPTCHA lures, and manual PowerShell script execution. |
Attribution | Attributed to TA571 and ClearFake, but also used by multiple unidentified actors. Possible overlap with UAC-0050 and Russian espionage. |
Recommendations | User training on ClickFix technique, improved security awareness, and vigilance to avoid executing untrusted PowerShell scripts. |
Source | Proofpoint |
Read full article: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/security-brief-clickfix-social-engineering-technique-floods-threat-landscape
Disclaimer: The above summary has been generated by an AI language model
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