Category | Details |
---|---|
Threat Actors | Not applicable (vulnerability exploitation by any malicious actors possible). |
Campaign Overview | Exploitation of vulnerabilities in OpenWrt’s Attended SysUpgrade (ASU) server, enabling attackers to compromise firmware integrity by injecting malicious commands and exploiting hash collisions. |
Target Regions (Or Victims) | OpenWrt users worldwide, including individuals and organizations relying on custom firmware for routers and network devices. |
Methodology | – Command injection during firmware build process. – Exploiting SHA-256 hash collision due to truncated hashes. – Leveraging malicious package names to execute arbitrary commands in the build environment. |
Product Targeted | OpenWrt operating system, specifically the Attended SysUpgrade (ASU) server. |
Malware Reference | Malicious firmware images created during exploitation (no specific malware named). |
Tools Used | NVIDIA RTX 4090 GPU, Hashcat (for brute-forcing hash collisions). |
Vulnerabilities Exploited | – Command injection flaw in ImageBuilder service. – Truncated SHA-256 hashes causing hash collisions (CVE-2024-54143, CVSS 9.3). |
TTPs | – Exploiting insufficient input sanitization. – Using shortened hashes to replace legitimate firmware. – Creating firmware that appears signed and legitimate to avoid detection. |
Attribution | General exploitation possible; no specific threat actor attributed. |
Recommendations | – Update OpenWrt devices with the latest patches immediately. – Avoid reliance on shortened hashes. – Implement strict input sanitization for critical processes. – Monitor systems for signs of malicious firmware. |
Source | SOCRadar |
Read full article: https://socradar.io/openwrts-attended-sysupgrade-vulnerability/
Disclaimer: The above summary has been generated by an AI language model
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